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1. INTRODUCTION
Thesecond half of the decade of the 1960s was one of dramatic
change in the physicians' services market. The Medicare and
Medicaid programs, instituted in 1966, provided coverage for
medical services for post-age 65 and poverty groups. Growth of
private insurance coverage for outpatient services was also substan-
tial. Per capita out-of-pocket expenditures on physicians' services
actually declined during the 1965—1970 period, in spite of a rise in
the physician fee index at a rate almost twice the Consumer Price
Index and an even greater rate of growth in money expenditures on
physicians' services. Whereas patients' out-of-pocket payments to
vendors of medical services constituted 63 per cent of total expen-
ditures on physicians' services in 1965, this percentage was down
to 40 by 1970.' Two previous studies (Feldstein, 1970; Steinwald
and Sloan, 1974) report that insurance coverage has a positive
impact on physicians' prices.
During this half-decade the physician-population ratio increased
by 7 per cent, reflecting an increased domestic medical school
output as well as greater immigration of foreign medical school
graduates.2 One would expect that higher ratios would depress
physicians' fees, but several studies (Feldstein, 1970; Huang and
Koropecky, 1973; and Newhouse, 1970) report that the physician-
321i
population ratio has a zero or even a positive impact. Some research primary cai
on the demand for hospital and medical services suggests that per dures often
capita population use of health care services is greater in high and adenoi
physician-population areas and that use is in part a consequence of In Sectio
physician availability (Davis and Russell, 1972; Feldstein, 1971a, decisions. F
1971b; Fuchs and Kramer, 1972). If an increased stock of physicians fee analysis
causes both higher prices and higher utilization, policy-makers may past researc
desire to reevaluate current government medical education policy tions. In the
that favors expansion of medical school capacity.
I
thesources
Product price increases often follow factor price increases. Wages that are imi
of allied health personnel rose substantially during 1965—1970.
Unlike the situation in many manufacturing industries, the growth in
money wages was not partially offset by productivity gains.3 Total
visits per physician week (an admittedly crude measure of physi- 2. MODELA
cianproductivity) did not rise during this period. Although there is
some interyear variation in the visits per week series, no trend is
evident.4 Demand
Manyexperts maintain that group practice is a better organiza- Lthd tional form than solo practice. Judging from the rapid growth in eeen
medical groups (8 per cent per year from 1965 to 1969), physicians (1) P =a0
are increasingly favoring this mode of practice.5 Given certain ± or
aspects of the internal incentive structure of medical groups, Sloan + a IN
(1974) warns that physicians practicing in groups may charge +6
higherfees, ceteris paribus.6 If this hypothesis is substantiated
empirically, policy-makers would certainly want to question the where P is
statements of many experts. of services
This study develops a model of physician fee-setting and tests the demand; I?
model with state cross-sections covering four years, 1967—1970. his potenti
The 1965—1970 period logically defines an era for this market, im- physician's
mediate pre-Medicare-Medicaid to the year before price controls ratio in th
(1971), but fee data are not available before 1967. The fee data and patients; a
information on physician characteristics used in this study come medical se
from annual surveys of physicians' practices conducted by the pected effe
American Medical Association. Other data, available from published Rather th
sources, are described below. surgical pr
The empirical analysis emphasizes general practitioners for two are likely to
reasons: First (and more important), the AMA surveys contain a specific
approximately twice as many general practitioners as physicians in visits and a
any other single field. State means for general practitioners merit and hospiti
more confidence that those of other specialties with relatively few Three va
observations for the smaller states.7 Second, public concern about tiOfl, experi
citizens' access to primary medical care of the type provided by in a special




primary care procedures were higher than those for other proce-
dures often performed by physicians (herniorrhaphy, tonsillectomy,
and adenoidectomy).8
In Section 2, I develop a model of physician output and price
decisions. Section 3 contains empirical results from the physicians'
fee analysis. In Section 4 I compare the results of this study with
past research and present conclusions and pertinent policy implica-
tions. In the appendix I describe the methods used to construct, and
the sources of variation in, several insurance and wage variables
that are important to this study.
2. MODEL AND VARIABLE SPECIFICATION
Demand Equation
Letthe demand schedule for the physician firm be:
(1) p = +a,Q+a,AT+a3INS+a4DEM+a.MDPOP
±or — ±or + ±or —
+ a6INC+a7PO
+ +
where P is the physician's fee (or an index of fees); Q,thequantity
of services demanded; AT, attributes of the physician affecting
demand; INS, private and government health insurance coverage of
his potential patients; DEM, demographic characteristics of the
physician's potential patients; MDPOP, the physician-population
ratio in the physician's market area; INC, income of potential
patients; and P0, the price of other providers of ambulatory
medical services. Signs below the a's indicate whether the ex-
pected effect is positive or negative.
Rather than specifying a demand curve for each type of medical or
surgical procedure, Equation (1) represents all services. Patients
are likely to judge a physician's overall costliness, not his charge for
a specific procedure. They cannot select one surgeon for office
visits and another for an appendectomy. A certain number of office
and hospital visits are complementary with an appendectomy,9
Three variables represent physician attributes: board certifica-
tion, experience, and foreign medical education. Board certification
in a specialty (BRD) should have a positive impact on demand.'° A









































ee increases forphysician has been licensed less than ten years in his current state is provide
of practice. This variable is expected to have a negative effect if it determinax
primarily accounts for relative inexperience in physician practice veloped in
andlor for a lack of patient contacts in his present location. But if' MCARE a
recently licensed physicians have been the recipients of a much equally str
more technically advanced medical education than other physi- too is cons
cians, the net impact of this variable on demand may be positive." Physicia
The professional education of foreign medical school graduates impact on
(FMG) may be regarded by some potential patients as technically two measu:
inferior, implying a negative impact on demand. All three physician io,ooo
attribute variables are expressed as percentages. other field
Third-party reimbursement enters in several ways. One specifi- measure di
cation contains three variables: (1) private health insurance expen- substitutab
ditures on health care services other than hospital (PRIVH); (2) The withir
Medicare Supplemental Medical Insurance Expenditures the betwee
(MCARE), representing the part of the Medicare program that may be so
covers physicians' services; and (3) Medicaid expenditures on positive in
physicians' services (MCAID). Each is divided by state population. included ii
In a second specification, the percentage of the population with 5) indicat€
major medical insurance (MMED) is substituted for PRIVH. There referral (3
is far less private insurance coverage under basic insurance plans because
for physicians' office visits, and home visits are typically covered has been e
under major medical plans once the deductible has been satisfied.'2 State pe
The fraction of medical expenditures paid by insurance (K), the impact on
sum of PRIVH, MCARE, and MCAID divided by an estimate of such as out
expenditures on medical services in the state per capita population, organizati
represents insurance in a third specification. As indicated below, sions with
the use of K is associated with a minor modification in Equation (1). were not
Medical care prices may affect the levels of insurance coverage as from the ri
well as the reverse.'3 To obtain consistent parameter estimates,
predicted values from regressions of PRIVH and K on a set of
exogenous variables are used in the empirical analysis of fees. A
regression for MMED has also been estimated, but an actual rather
than a predicted series represents MMED in the fee analysis. The CostEquatui
appendixprovides details on reimbursement variable construction, There are
results of PRIVH, K, and MMED regressions, as well as justifica- reflects no
tion for using actual rather than predicted values of MMED.
(2)C =c
TheMedicare variable (MCARE) primarily reflects the propor- '
tionof the state's population over age 65 and demographic charac-
teristics of persons in this age group (and thus may be considered a + (c13
demographicas well as an insurance variable), characteristics of the ±0
state'shealth delivery system, and, finally, Medicare carrier reim- As Equ
bursement policy. An account of the sources of variation in MCARE functional
324 Sloan 325 Pti hiscurrent state
egative effect if it
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it location. But if
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is provided in the appendix. Available evidence indicates that
determinants of MCARE's variation are outside the model de-
veloped in this study, and, therefore, itis appropriate to treat
MCARE as exogenous in the empirical analysis. Unfortunately,
equally strong evidence is not available for MCAID. it
too is considered exogenous.
Physicians per 10,000 population is expected to have a negative
impact on per physician demand. The empirical analysis includes
two measures: the number of physicians in the physician's field per
10,000 population (MDPOP1) and the number of physicians in all
other fields per 10,000 population (MDPOP2). The use of a single
measure does not permit distinguishing among varying degrees of
substitutability of physicians' services in different specialty fields.
The within-field cross-elasticity of demand should be higher than
the between-field cross-elasticity. In fact, physicians in other fields
may be sources of referrals, implying that MDPOP2 may have a
positive impact on demand for services of physicians in the field
included in MDPOP1. But evidence presented in Shortell (1971, p.
5) indicates that general practitioners receive few patients on
referral (3 per cent of all new patients).'4 For this reason, and
because MDPOP1 and MDPOP2 are highly collinear, MDPOP2
has been excluded from the general practitioner fee regressions.
State per capita income (INC) should generally have a positive
impact on demand. One expects that the price of other providers,
such as outpatient departments of hospitals and health maintenance
organizations, should have a positive effect. Preliminary regres-
sions with the price of other providers of ambulatory services (P0)
were not encouraging. Therefore, the variable has been excluded
from the regressions presented in this study.'5
CostEquation
Thereare two cost functions for the physician firm. The first
reflects non-physician input costs:




As Equation (2) is specified, both fixed and marginal costs are
functionally dependent on factor prices, which are treated as
325 Physician Fee InflationI
exogenous to the physician (and to the physician services sector as a
whole). Measures of the wage rate of nonphysician personnel regressions
(WAGE) and of the per unit cost of space (RENT) represent the unreliable.
factor prices. The method used to construct WAGE (expressed in income Va
terms of the weekly wage rate for secretarial-clerical personnel) is ciently enc
discussed in the appendix. The largest part of the inter-physician Several
variation in capital costs probably relates to space. Unfortunately, influence I
measuresof rental rates available for this study are poor. The enjoy the
available unit cost of space measure proved to be highly collinear cians impu
with other variables in the regressions. All capital costs, actual nately, it is
and/or imputed, constitute only approximately 10 per cent of total of medicir
practice expenses, certainly far less of the total than the non- above as
physician labor component. For these reasons, RENT is excluded board-cert'
from the regressions presented in this study.16 of medicin
The principal input to the physician firm is the physician himself. certificatio
Although there is no transaction between the self-employed physi- effect on f
cian as buyer and this physician as seller of his own labor, the value The sec
he imputes to his own input affects his price and output behavior, wage, is




The imputed value of physician's time (C2) depends on a number
of personal and professional factors. Using previous research as a According
guide, the following personal factors are relevant. As the physician with phys
grows older, his personal return to further asset accumulation about we
diminishes. Thus, older physicians are likely to place a higher as part Ot
value on leisure time. Sloan (1975) reports that physician hours of the same'
work decline with age. The variable AGE refers to the percentage positive e
of physicians by field, state, and year who are aged 55 or over, come and
Judging from Sloan (1973, 1975) physician income from property
has a small positive effect on the physician's imputed wage;'7
female physicians with children have higher imputed wages. This
is not true of female physicians without children. Unfortunately, d data on physicians' property income and children are not available Outputan
ina form usable for this study.'8 It is possible to distinguish The mode
between male and female physicians, but without data on the (1) throug
number of children, a variable indicating the percentage of physi- his imput
cians who are female would serve no useful function. cian prefe
Although health status would appear to affect the imputed wage a support ti
priori,Sloan(1975) failed to find a relationship between health and Sloan
status and physician effort. Thus, the lack of suitable data on
'4) =ç
physicians'health is not disturbing. Feldstein (1970) hypothesized
that physicians will work more when their income falls relative to Differenti
others in the community. However, the variable to measure this quantity i









































("reference income") effect is significant in only one out of the nine
regressions he presents. Sloan (1974b) also found this variable to be
unreliable. Therefore, although data for a relative or reference
income variable are available, past research has not been suffi-
ciently encouraging to warrant this variable's inclusion.
Several variables related to the physician as a professional may
influence the physician's imputed wage. Clearly, some physicians
enjoy the practice of medicine more than others, and these physi-
cians impute a correspondingly lower wage to their effort. Unfortu-
nately, it is difficult to find objective factors associated with a "love
of The board certification variable (BRD), included
above as a demand variable, may serve this role, assuming that
hoard-certified physicians derive more pleasure from the practice
of medicine than others. If so, the positive demand effect of board
certification on physicians' fees may be offset by a negative supply
effect on fees.2°
The second cost function, measuring the physicians' imputed
wage, is specified as
(3) C2 =c20+c21AGE+(c22+c23AGE)Q
±or+ ±or +
According to Equation (3), imputed fixed and marginal costs rise
with physician age.2' Because of the aforementioned uncertainty
about the use of BRD as a supply variable, it has not been included
as part of Equation (3). If it were to be included, it would enter in
the same manner as AGE, but it would have a negative rather than a
positive effect on C2. The unavoidable exclusion of property in-
come and female physicians with children is unfortunate.
Outputand Price Equations
Themodel assumes that the physician's objective, given equations
(1) through (3), is to maximize profit, defined as his earnings above
his imputed wage. Including the imputed wage allows for physi-
cian preferences for leisure as well as goods. Empirical evidence to
support the profit maximization assumption is given in Steinwald
and Sloan (1974).22
(4)ir=PQ—C,—C2
Differentiating ir, one obtains the following expressions for optimal










+a7PO +c13+c14WAGE+c15RENT +c22 +c23AGE)23 puts, shar
individual
If K is the proportion of the fee paid by both private and public c22 and
thirdparties, then Equation(1) may be rewrittenas equations
P = + bX + KP, (1)', where X stands for all exogenous demand
variables. KP replaces a3INS in Equation (1). Letting the sum of the As dem
two cost equations be of no ecoi






(9) =[e +bX/(l —K)]/2
According to Equation (9), each exogenous demand variable is to indivic
divided by the proportion of the out-of-pocket fee paid by the group-siz
patient. This specification implies that patients possess perfect grounds, I
knowledgeof their insurance coverage before purchasing medical usefully b
services and hence base utilization decisions on the price net of two group
insurance. But if patients gain precise information about their =
coverageafter the fact, equations (5) and (6), which allow a higher ing in gn
utilization response to gross price than to insurance, may provide physician
better explanations of observed behavior than equations (8) and Propon
(9).24Withone modification, equations (6) and (9) provide the basis resulting:





A substantial number of physicians share costs andIor revenues and Lorar
with other physicians.25 If one could be certain that decisions with six
involving practice price, output levels, and input purchases were specialty
made collectively by group members, a model appropriate for the include a
solo practitioner would fit group medical practice equally well. But and Lora
if these decisions are made by individual physicians within the groups, W
group,the model must be modified. Sharing costs reduces the Kimbell
incentive to minimize non-physician costs in that the individual GRP2's i
physician member bears an increasingly smaller proportion of the tively.







the sum of the
and variable is



















financial consequences of his failure to control costs as group size
rises. If both revenues and costs are shared, the financial return to
individual effort decreases as group size rises. Although an ar-
rangement such as one in which physicians share both revenues
and costs equally results in equal reductions in both marginal
revenue and the marginal cost associated with non-physician in-
puts, sharing does not reduce the marginal cost associated with
individual physician labor, the cost represented by Equation (3). If
c22 and c23 of Equation (3) were zero, output and price given by
equations (5) and (6) would be unaffected, but this is very unlike-
ly.26
As demonstrated formally in Sloan (1974a), under the assumption
of no economies of scale arising from better use of non-physician
labor and capital inputs, it is appropriate to multiply both c22 and c23
by the number of physicians (n) in the group if net income of the
practice is divided equally among its physician members. When net
income is divided into unequal shares (Os, a fraction signifying the
share to thephysician), c22 and c23 should be multiplied by 1/Os.
Intuitively, smaller shares of net income are greater disincentives
to individual effort. Although a price equation containing age!
group-size interaction terms would be desirable on conceptual
grounds, the sample size limits the. number of variables that may
usefully be included. Regressions in the empirical section contain
two group-size variables entered in a linear, noninteractive fashion
(GRP1 =percentageof physicians by field, state, and year practic-
ing in groups of three to ten physicians; GRP2 =percentageof
physicians in groups of eleven or more physicians).
Proponents of group practice stress potential economies of scale
resulting from more efficient use of non-physician labor and sophis-
ticated capital equipment. Scale economies from these sources may
offset disincentives to individual physician effort. Kimbell and
Lorant (1973) report increasing returns to scale for small to
medium-size groups relative to solo practice and decreasing returns
for large groups. Results made available to this author by Kimbell
and Lorant indicate maximum efficiency for single-specialty groups
with six physicians and a slow decline in the efficiency of single-
specialty groups thereafter. Multispecialty groups, which generally
include more than ten physicians, appear on the basis of Kimbell
and Lorant's work to be inefficient relative to single-specialty
groups, which usually have fewer than this number. On the basis of
Kimbell and Lorant's research, one would expect CRP1's and




Usual Fees Versus Average Revenue revenue
Two types of price variables serve as dependent variables: the fee probably
usually charged by the physician; and average revenue, which is average
the physician's gross annual revenue divided by an estimate of his to collect
total annual visits. The usual fees analyzed correspond to the
• • . •. Insum physician s follow-up office visit, hospital visit, and appendectomy. lk 1t These procedures are frequently performed by physicians and
•1eY0
reflectthe physician's mean fee level. iso a ion.
•. . .. . . explanato For purposes of empirical analysis of physician fee inflation,
however, usual fees have two potential deficiencies. First, if there
is price discrimination and/or related behavior (e.g., a collection
ratio less than 1), the usual price overstates the physician's average
price. If such behavior is unrelated to the fee equation's explana- 3EMPIRIC
toryvariables, this presents no problem. Some experts contend,
however, that a major effect of increased third-party reimbursement Tables 1
has been to reduce price discrimination. Judging from data pre- titioner, s
sented in Owens (1973), the dollar value of "free and reduced-fee by the sq
services" in 1971 was from 1 to 2 per cent of gross billings. Since
this percentage is so low, price discrimination is not likely to be an
important factor in a 1967—1970 cross-sectional study.
Second, although the AMA requests usual fees for specific Table1
proceduresin its annual mail questionnaires, some ambiguity from The perf(
• the standpoint of the responding physician undoubtedly remains. regressiol
For example, it may be customary for some physicians to include (PRIVH)
routine laboratory services as part of the office visit charge. Instead nary
ofraising his fees, physicians may decide to bill separately for excluded
laboratory work and hold the usual charge for the office visit sented in
constant. To the extent that this type of behavior is unrelated to the payments
independent variables, the only consequence is a relatively poor fit insurance
for the regression equation as a whole. But evidence presented in rowly de
Sloan and Steinwald (1975) suggests that the structure of basic and the
insurance plans does encourage the physician to bill separately for "billing
minor tasks that might otherwise be included in office visit, PRIVH p
hospital visit, and/or surgical charges. lar efforts
The average revenue measure overcomes these objections, but it to homog
too has deficiencies. First, it does not hold the physician's proce- and signi
dure mix and the number of procedures performed per visit elasticitie
constant. Research by Bailey (1970) indicates that group-practice practition
physicians perform more procedures per visit than their colleagues does not
in solo practice. Lab tests, for example, may be performed by the Major i
groupphysician who owns the necessary equipment. The solo on
acommercial laboratory for collinear
testing. This implies that group-practice coefficients in average examine









































•revenue equations may be biased upward. Second, there are
probably measurement errors in visits, the denominator of the
average revenue series. Visit data appear to be particularly difficult
to collect by mail questionnaire. Although errors in visits may affect
goodness of fit, no potential biases are
In sum, neither measure is fully appropriate. Analysis of both is
likely to be more informative than analysis of either one in
isolation. Dependent variables and allmonetarily expressed
explanatory variables are deflated by a state price index.27
3.EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Tables1 and 2 present fee regressions based on general prac-
titioner, surgeon, and internist data. All regressions are weighted
by the square root of state population.
Table1 Regressions
Theperformance of the reimbursement variables in the Table 1
regressions is mixed. The private health insurance benefits variable
(PRIVH) has a consistently implausible negative sign in prelimi-
nary office and hospital visit fee regressions and is therefore
excluded from the office and hospital visit fee regressions pre-
sented in Table 1. The PRIVH variable includes basic insurance
payments, and, as stated above, there is some evidence that basic
insurance encourages the physician to submit bills for more nar-
rowly defined procedures. A visit that does not include lab tests
and the like, is likely to cost less than one that does. This
"billing effect" may have introduced a negative bias into the
PRIVH parameter estimates. Future surveys should make particu-
lar efforts to ensure that physicians' responses to fee questions refer
to homogeneous procedures. By contrast, PRIVH is always positive
and significant in the average revenue equations, with implied
elasticities at the means of the observations of 0.75 (general
practitioners) and 1.20 (internists). The average revenue measure
does not reflect the billing effect.
Major medical insurance (MMED) demonstrates a greater impact
on average revenue than on usual fees. This variable is highly
collinear with INC, however, and for this reason one should
examine MMED and INC together. Without INC, Regression (1) of
331 Physician Fee InflationTable 1, MMED has a significant impact on the general prac-
titioner's office visit fee. The implied elasticity at the means of the
observations is small, 0.17. With INC included, Regression (2),
MMED's parameter estimate becomes negative with a high stan-
dard error. The elasticity associated with INC in all office and
hospital visit fee regressions presented in Table 1 is around 0.6.
The coefficients of MMED are positive and larger than their
standard errors in both hospital visit regressions ([4] and [51).
As before, the implied elasticities are small. Steinwald and
Sloan (1974), an empirical analysis of physicians' fees at the
level of the individual physician using 1971 data, reports low
MMED (defined as in this study) elasticities derived from GP office




















TABLE 1Price Equations: General Specifications
LICIO FMG
Dependent .
Variable INC PRIVH MMED MCARE MCAID INS MDPOPI MDPOP2BRD
General Practitioners
1. Office — — 0.020' 0.088' — — —0.11 .— —
visit fee (—) (—) (0.005) (0.014) (—) (—) (0.08) (—) (—)
2. OffIce 0.00095' — —0.0015 0.069' 0.0033 — —0.22' — —
visit fee (0.00017) (—) (0.0058)(0.014) (0.0076) (—) (0.08) (—) (—)
3. Office 0.0010' — — — — 0.0098 —0.23' —
visit fee (0.0002) (—) (—) (—) (—) (0.0056) (0.09) (—) (—)
4. Hospital 0.0011' — 0.013 0.162' — — —0.39' — —
visit fee (0.0003) (—) (0.010) (0.025) (—) (—) (0.14) (—) (—)
5. Hospital0.00092' — 0.0036' 0.161' 0.022 — —0.36' — —
visit fee (0.00030) (—) (0.0010)(0.025) (0.015) (—) (0.15) (—) (—)
6. Average —0.00035 — 0.054 0.436' 0.036' — —1.65' — —
revenue (0.00080) (—) (0,031) (0.075) (0.011) (—) (0.44) (—) (—)
7. Average —0.0011 0.25' — 0.50' 0.059 — —1.93' — —
revenue (0.0077) (0.06) C—) (0.07) (0.104) (—) (0.44) (—) (—)
Surgeons
8. Appen- — — 0.21 0.84 0.061 — —29.81'6.67' —
dectomy (—) (—) (0.19) (0.63) (0.322) (—) (10.11)(1.25) (—)
fee
9. Appen. —0.014 — 0.49' 0.97 —0.076 — —31.84' 7.56' —
dectomy (0.008) (—) (0.24) (0.64) (0.331) (—) (10.53)(1.36) (—)
fee .
Internists .
10. Average — — 0.091' 0.78' — — —1.94' — —
revenue (—) (—) (0.042) (0.10) (—) (—) (0.64) (—) C—)
11. Average—0.0022 0.48' — 0.87' —0.052 — 0.46—0.40 —0.005
revenue (0.0014) (0.12) (—) (0.12) (0.185) (—) (1.86)(0.47) (0.009)
'5tandard errors in parentheses.
Indicates 5 per cent significance level (two-tail test).
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LIC1O FMG WAGE AGE GAP1 GRP2 Constant
General Practitioners













(—) (—) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.62) F(9,179) =30.5'































(—) (—) (0.012) (0.048) (0.006) (0.026) (1.09) F(9,178) = 27.9'
— — 0.035 0.004 0.047' —0.0013 2.43 8'0.39
(—) . C—) (0.031) (0.014) (0.018) (0.0072) (3.09) F(9,133) =9.4'
—0.0013 —0.0070 0.049 0.010 0.036' 0.0057 1.32' 8' = 0.45
(0.018) (0.023) (0.030) (0.015) (0.018) (0.069) (0.42) F(11,131) = 9.7'
Surgeons
— — 1.88' — — — —35.97 82 = 0.58
C—) (—) (0.25) C—) (—) C—) (26.5) F(6,163) = 32.7°
1.95' — — — —14.04 8' = 0.59
() (—) (0.26) (—) (—) C—) (29.3) F(9,160) = 25.3°
Internists
— . — —0.66 — 0.027 0.010 8.13 8'0.35
(—) (—) (0.46) (—) (0.024) (0.020) (4.60) F(8,118) = 7.8'
—0.016 0.055 —0.47 0.006 0.043 0.007 8.23 8' = 0.42
(0.023) (0.042) (0.54) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (5.53) F(13,113) = 6.4'
parameter estimates are significant at the 5 per cent level or better
in all instances whereas those in Table 1 are not. The higher
precision of the Steinwald-Sloan estimates probably reflects a
lower degree of collinearity between the income measure and
MM ED. The elasticities associated with the MMED coefficients in
the Table 1 appendectomy fee equations (based on surgeon data)
are also small, 0.1 and less. Major medical insurance has a much
greater impact on average revenue. MMED elasticities based on
regressions (6) and (10) are 0.48 and 0.52, respectively.28
Medicare supplemental insurance benefits per capita population
(MCARE) is significant in all but the appendectomy fee equations.
If MCARE primarily reflected usual fee levels, it would probably
perform better in the office, hospital, and the appendectomy 'fee
f














































jequations than in the average revenue equations. This clearly is not
the case. Elasticities from average revenue equations are far higher
(0.6 to 0.75) than are those from the usual fee equations (around
0.1). As explained in the appendix, MCARE reflects the state's
demographic characteristics, features of its health care delivery
system, and deliberate policies of the Medicare carriers. These
exogenous influences have clearly had an impact on physicians'
price and output behavior, particularly on average revenue. In
some preliminary regressions, the percentage of persons in the
state aged 65 and over was substituted for MCARE. That variable
performed relatively poorly. Steinwald and Sloan (1974) report
similarly inconclusive results using the percentage over age 65
variable in usual fee equations.
The Medicaid (MCAID) variable demonstrates no impact on fees
in the Table 1 regressions. Table l's Regression (3) contains INS,
the sum of PRIVH, MCARE, and MCAID. Although almost sig-
nificant at the 5 per cent level, the associated elasticity is low (0.05).
This result principally reflects the poor performance of PRIVH and
MCAID, as demonstrated by other regressions.
Coefficients of MDPOP1 are significant in the general prac-
titioner regressions. GP regressions containing both general prac-
titioners per 10,000 population (MDPOP1) and physicians in other
fields per 10,000 population (MDPOP2), not reported, have also
been estimated. Sums of the coefficients of the two physician
variables are negative and significant at the 1 per cent level.29 The
MDPOP1 and MDPOP2 coefficients in the appendectomy fee
equations for surgeons are also significant (negatively) individually
and as a sum. The physician-population coefficients in the internist
regressions are implausible, Elasticities associated with MDPOP1
are generally small (under —0.2), with the exception of general
practitioner average revenue, in which they are around unity. The
parameter estimates corresponding to board certification (BRD),
the newly licensed physician (LIC1O), and the foreign medical
school graduate (FMG) are unreliable. Similar results have been
obtained previously (Steinwald and Sloan, 1974).
Wages affect office, hospital visit, and appendectomy fees in the
expected manner; associated elasticities range from 0.66 to 0.92.
Although insignificant at conventional levels, the wage parameter
estimates in the average revenue equations imply similar elas-
ticities (0.63 to 0.68). The only implausible wage coefficients are in
internist average revenue equations. In these, reimbursement
dominates the effects of the other variables. Age coefficients (AGE)
are often negative and, as a rule, imprecise.
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Evaluat Judging from Kimbell and Lorant (1973), the GRP1 and GRP2 means, re parameter estimates should be negative and positive, respectively, by about 1 If increased scale does not result in better utilization of aides and per cent. equipment, Sloan's assumption (1974a), then both GRP coefficients Table 2 of should be positive and GRPZ's should exceed GRP1's coefficient. l's. Howe The GRP signs in Table 1 are too erratic to lend strong support to INC coeff either view. Moreover, significance tests on the sum of Table l's with asso GRP coefficients are never significant. INC to pe
reimburse
are not inc
Table2 Regressions arenot av
the implie. The equations in Table 2 are based on the alternative specification should be of insurance. All five regressions are based on general practitioner Estimat data. The lab fee regression pertains to urinalysis, a frequently are performed laboratory procedure. in other fi
As above, the effect of third-party reimbursement on average and one
revenue is much more obvious than on usual fees. From Equation MDPOP1
(9), it is evident that the 1 per
OP*/OK =[bxI2(1—K)2] equation.
variables where X represents all exogenous demand equation variables, office anc
Based on (10), the elasticity of average revenue with respect to the in proportion paid by third parties, evaluated at the means of the enue equ observations, isslightly above unity.3' The derivative OP*/äK significan
corresponding to the usual fee equations is negative at the means of cent leve
the observations (at which the derivative is evaluated), an implaus- significan
ible result but one that is consistent with the implausible behavior ing to the of PRIVH in Table l's usual fee equations. PRIVH accounts for regressio
about three-fourthsof totalthird-party reimbursements, K's elasticiti€
numerator.
As shown in the appendix, income's coefficient in the K equation
is negative. Therefore, the coefficients of INC overstate the impact
of income on both usual fees and average revenues. The following Fee-setting
adjustmentprocedure considers the indirect effect of INC through Although
K on P as well as the INC's direct effect on P. Let bethe to study f
parameter estimate of INC andtheparameter estimate of other because
exogenous demand variables interacting with K, andX1 be the other
. maybe r
exogenous (noninsurance) demand variables, spread p:
Then,






jEvaluating using Equation (11) at the observational
means, reduces the estimated impact of income from Regression (1)
by about 12 per cent and its impact from Regression (4) by about 24
per cent. Using the adjusted measures of income's impact, the
Table 2 office and hospital visit fee elasticities are similar to Table
l's. However, unlike the Table 1 regressions, the average revenue
INC coefficients are positive and significantly different from zero
with associated elasticities in excess of unity. One would expect
INC to perform somewhat better in the K equations because other
reimbursement variables collinear with INC (PRIVH and MMED)
are not included. Moreover, the sample differs since estimates of K
are not available for all states. But even considering these factors,
the implied impact of income on average revenue appears high and
should be interpreted cautiously.
Estimates of impact of the physician-population ratio (MDPOP1)
are approximately the same as Table l's. The number of physicians
in other fields per 10,000 population (MDPOP2) enters the lab fee
and one of the average revenue equations. The sum of the
MDPOP1 and MDPOP2 coefficients is significant (negatively) at
the 1 per cent level in the average revenue but not in the lab fee
equation. As before, parameter estimates of the FMG and LIC1O
variables are generally insignificant. The WAGE coefficients in the
office and hospital visit regressions are virtually the same as those
in corresponding Table 1 regressions. Those in the average rev-
enue equation are somewhat higher. The GRP coefficients are not
significant individually but are positive and significant at the 5 per
cent level or better in four out of five regressions. Although
significant, the associated elasticities are low.32 Those correspond-
ing to the sum of GRP1 and GRP2 in the office and hospital visit fee
regressions are in the 0.1 range. The higher of the two group
elasticities from the average revenue regressions is almost 0.3.
Fee-settingDynamics
Althoughthe data base covers only four years, an attempt was made
to study fee-setting dynamics. Fees may move towardwith a lag
because physicians are uncertain about P*'s precise level or they
may be motivated by a desire (based on ethical considerations) to
spread price changes over a period of years. A simple adjustment
mechanism is provided by the partial equilibrium adjustment
model.
(12) — = X(P*— 0 <A 1
RPI and GRP2
e, respectively.























Let b1 be the
timate of other
X1 be the other
j
337 Physician Fee InflationAs is well known, A is estimated by including a lagged dependent with the
variable as an explanatory variable. Ordinary least squares (OLS) Sloan (19
results in estimates that are both seriously biased and inconsis- titioner,
tent.33 Eliminating the 1967 observations and using OLS, the obstetrici
implied values of A for general practitioner office and hospital visit major me
fees are 0.41 and 0.22', respectively, with associated tratiosin The majc
excess of 9.0. Employing a method developed by Nerlove for but the S
obtaining consistent estimates of A (described in Nerlove and studies
Schultz, 1970), the implied values of A exceed 0.9, with associated t Newhous
ratios below 1.0 in all regressions. The results presented in the sions thai
above tables are based on the assumption of immediate adjustment. tage of pi
The estimate of A using the Nerlove technique supports this has an in
assumption. But in view of the low tvalueassociated with this Althou
estimate, this finding does not merit much confidence. Transforma- signiflcai
tions of the data required by the Nerlove procedure clearly reveal ness of:










Theempirical results indicate that third-party reimbursement has a mates
agreater impact on average appear ti
revenue than on usual physician fees. The Medicare variable is the more uk
only consistently reliable reimbursement variable in the usual fee capita mi
equations, but theelasticitiesassociated with Medicare study s e
parameter estimates in these equations are low. This finding ' Medic
implies that health insurance principally affects the type of care cent yea
rendered under such standard headings as a follow-up office and/or schools i
hospitalvisit, the extent to which price discrimination is practiced, public si
collection ratios, as well as the number and complexity of proce- creases
dures performed per visit. Unfortunately, itis not possible to physicia:
determine which of these is relatively important. As mentioned Some
above, price discrimination is quantitatively unimportant and can- support
not perse beheld responsible for the observed patterns, positive
Two previous studies provide conflicting evidence on the impact study, bi
of health insurance on physicians' usual fees. Using aggregate time pararnet
series data, Feldstein (1970) reports a long-run elasticity (based on Koropec
significant insurance parameter estimates) of a measure of the ratio has
average price of physicians' services with respect to an insurance but the
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the Medicare
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with the results for average price reported above. Steinwald and
Sloan (1974) report that insurance has an impact on general prac-
titioner,surgeon, and internist fees but not on those of
obstetricians-gynecologists or pediatricians. The significance of
major medical insurance receives particular attention in that study.
The major medical coefficients are similar to those reported here,
but the Steinwald-Sloan coefficients are far more significant. Both
studies find small usual fee-major medical elasticities. Although
Newhouse (1970) does not present the results of usual fee regres-
sions that contain an insurance variable (in that study, the percen-
tage of population with insurance), he points out that this variable
has an insignificant effect on his usual fee measures.
Although previous studies of physicians' fees have reported some
significant income parameter estimates, the implied responsive-
ness of fees to income varies. Parameter estimates reported in
Feldstein (1970) and Steinwald and Sloan (1974) imply a lower
degree of responsiveness than do those for office and hospital visit
charges in this study. Newhouse (1970) reports price elasticities in
the 0.7to 0.9 range, a somewhat greater impact. However,
Newhouse's estimates come from regressions that include only one
to three independent variables. Since several potential influences
on fees are not represented in Newhouse's regressions, such as
factor prices, it is almost certain that his income parameter esti-
mates are biased upward. Based on available evidence, it would
appear that usual fee-income elasticities in the 0.5 to 0.6 range are
more likely. Unfortunately, no conclusion on the impact of per
capita income on average revenue is warranted on the basis of this
study's empirical evidence.
Medical school enrollments have increased substantially in re-
cent years, as have the number of graduates of foreign medical
schools practicing in the United States. One factor responsible for
public support of medical education is the presumption that in-
creases in the physician-population ratio will at least temper
physician fee inflation.
Some past research tends to contradict this rationale for public
support of medical education. The physician-population ratio has a
positive impact on the average physician fee in the Feldstein (1970)
study, but the t ratios associated with the physician-population ratio
parameter estimates are always less than1.In Huang and
Koropecky (1973), the rate of change of the physician-population
ratio has a positive impact on the rate of change in physicians' fees,
but the associated t ratio is far less than 1. In regressions with the
rate of change in Medicare physicians' fees over the period 1967—
339 Physician Fee Inflation1969 as the dependent variable, physician-population ratio has a been mea:
negative, insignificant impact in one equation, but is positive and onstrate n
significant in another. Huang and Koropecky (1973) emphasize the Steinwald
second results, concluding that "the reasons might be that supply best a mm
creates its own demand; physicians reduce their working hours; include a
physician density correlates with better information about markets variables
and what they will bear" (p. 35). According to the way the model should be
(on which these conclusions are based) is specified, not only does
the physician-population ratio force the physician's price up, but
since the ratio is specified to interact with last year's price, the
positive effect of the ratio on fees is strengthened with each
successive price increase. This pessimistic implication is not plaus- APPENDIX:
iblesince it implies that fees in high-ratio states will continue to VARIABLES
divergefrom fees in low-ratio states without end.
Newhouse (1970) reports that the physician-population ratio has This appe
a positive and significant impact on usual physicians' fees. His more fully
results would provide the strongest case for a positive impact, but
since his model omits several plausible fee determinants, in par-
ticular factor prices, it is not clear that his positive sign on the Methodsfor
physician-populationratio coefficient truly represents the partial ' Variables
effectof the physician stock.
The results presented in the preceding section supportview Three re:
that increases in the physician stock will temper fee increases, at health in:
least in the general practitioner and surgeon submarkets. However, fraction o.
the magnitude of the fee response is low. Steinwald and Sloan and pubh
(1974) show a similar result. Given the policy importance of this medical ii
finding as well as the contradictory evidence from past studies, it An expl
would be useful to conduct additional tests on the influence of the
physician-population ratio on fees. (13)PRIVH'
Many policy-makers and experts on health care delivery advocate
group medical practice. Tests presented in this study for the impact
of group practice on fees are inconclusive. A significantly positive
group-practice effect appears in regressions with relatively few
explanatory variables. But even the elasticities associated with where B
these estimates are low. BLUBEN
An objective of this study at its outset was to study fee-setting fits;
dynamics. Although there is some descriptive evidence to suggest a benefits;]
slow adjustment speed, there are no reliable estimates of the lag ance bem
structure based on statistical analysis. Unfortunately, analysis of a union pla
time series of four cross-sections has not improved the state of health ins
knowledge on this subject. (therefore
Although variables expressing such physician characteristics as tifying Bli
age, board certification status, and location of medical school have dent
































ce to suggest a
ites of the lag
,analysisof a
d the state of
•Lracteristics as
•al school have
been measured with precision in this study, these variables dem-
onstrate no systematic effect on fees. Given a similar pattern in
Steinwald and Sloan (1974), it appears that these variables have at
best a minor influence on physician fees. Nevertheless, studies that
include a more comprehensive list of physician characteristics




Thisappendix describes the reimbursement and wage variables
more fully.
Methodsfor Constructing Three Reimbursement
Variables
Threereimbursement variables have been constructed: private
health insurance benefits per capita population (PRIVH); the
fraction of medical expenditures paid by insurance, both private
and public (K); and the percentage of the population with major
medical insurance (MMED).
An explicit expression for PRIVH is:






where BLUSBEN =BlueShield health insurance benefits;
BLUBEN =BlueCross plus Blue Shield health insurance bene-
fits; COMBENcommercial health and disability insurance
benefits; DISPAY =disabilityinsurance benefits; INDBEN =insur-
ance benefits of independent health insurance plans (for example,
union plans, prepaid group practices); YB,and=thefraction of
health insurance benefits for expenses other than hospitalization
(therefore, primarily for physicians' services) with subscripts iden-
tifying Blue Cross-Blue Shield, commercial insurers, and indepen-
dent plans, respectively. State population and the state price index
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IPhysician Fee Inflationare POP and P1. Although Blue Cross usually reimburses hospital InsuranceI
services, Blue Shield's reimbursements are primarily for physi- Most of cians, except in a few states. In some of these states there is no Blue variables Shield organization, and Blue Cross makes payments to physicians;
in a few others, Blue Shield financial data contain payments to
hospitals. In either of these two cases, Blue Cross-Blue Shield percenta
benefit payments to physicians are multiplied by YB.Thevariable Z
assumes the value of 1 in such cases. When Blue Shield adequately tions (N(
work in r represents reimbursement for physicians' services (as in most number states), Z equals
Direct estimates of commercial health insurance benefits are not
available and must therefore be constructed from a published series dummy
Severa that provides commercial health and disability insurance benefit and dem payments by state and year (Health Insurance Institute, 1968— higher in 1971). Estimates of disability payments (DISPAY)35 and benefits of However independent plans (INDBEN) are subtracted from COM BEN.36 All an increa data with the exception of the ys are for states and the years likely to The js are national averages constructed from Muel- account ler savings f
(14)K =PRIVH+MCARE+MCAID tein and
EXP of health
and even
where EXP is an estimate of private and public expenditures on places ur
physicians' services in the state. Explicitly, tage. Per
purchase
PEXP +OPDEXP cannot a (15)EXP =
POP adjusting
persons
PEXP and OPDEXP are expenditures on physicians' services in to deman
private practice and expenditures on physicians' services in hospi- The po




Unpublished estimates of persons with commercial major medical reimburs
coverage by year and state (COMMED) have been provided by the / beenexc
Health Insurance Institute. Comparable data for 1967—1970 for the what effe
Blues are not available. Therefore, estimates of Blue Cross-Blue 65 is not i
Shield major medical are derived by multiplying Blue Cross-Blue possible
Shield enrollment by state and year (BLUCOV) by the national from the
ratio of the Blues' major medical to basic plan enrollment (p), which Both p
is available for the years 1967—1970. panded n
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Mostof the variation in each of the above three reimbursement
variables may be explained by per capita income (INC), the
percentage of employees who are members of unions (UNION), the
percentage of manufacturing firms with 2,500 employees or more
(SIZE), the percentage of persons employed in nonfirm occupa-
tions (NONAG), the percentage of nonagricultural employees who
work in manufacturing (MANU) or government services (COy), the
number of restricted activity days per capita population (RAD), the
percentage of persons in the state aged 65 and over (PAT65), and
dummy variables for the years 1968, 1969, and 1970.
Several mechanisms underlie the relationship between income
and demand for health insurance. If risk aversion diminishes at
higher income levels, so should the demand for health insurance.
However, as Feldstein (1973) points out, higher income generates
an increased demand for medical care; insurance companies are not
likely to take this positive income elasticity on utilization into
account when establishing premium schedules. Moreover, tax
savings from insurance purchases favor the more affluent. (Feld-
tein and Allison, 1972; Mitchell and Vogel, 1973.) Group purchases
of health insurance are much cheaper than those by individuals,
and even among group purchases, there are scale economies. This
places unions, large firms, and governmental agencies at an advan-
tage. Persons employed in agriculture are least likely to be able to
purchase group insurance. Since the health insurers do not (or
cannot at a reasonable cost) fully control adverse selection by
adjusting rates andlor by the sale of the policies themselves,
persons with lower-health status (measured by RAD) are expected
to demand more insurance.
The population age variable (PAT65) performs a different role in
each of three health insurance equations. The PAT65 coefficient in
the PRIVH (private health insurance benefits) equation may be
negative since older persons have less private health insurance
coverage. It is likely to have a positive impact on K since Medicare
reimbursements are part of K's numerator. The PAT65 variable has
been excluded from the MMED equation because it is not clear
what effect it would have. Although coverage for persons over age
65 is not included in commercial major medical coverage, it was not
possible to completely eliminate enrollment of those over age 65
from the estimated series for the Blues.4°
Both private and public coverage for physicians' services ex-
panded rapidly during 1967—1970. Growth in private coverage may
343 Physician Fee Inflationreflect the very rapid increase in physicians' fees relative to the
Consumer Price Index during 1966 and 1967; or, since the increase
in major medical insurance was particularly dramatic, an increasing
realization by the public that "first dollar" coverage under basic
plans offers inadequate protection against serious risks. Dummy
time variables account for (but do not explain) structural changes in
the demand for insurance during this period.
Table 1 contains the insurance regressions. The K regressions are
based on fewer observations since expenditure data are not availa-
ble for several states and years. Judging by the R 2's, the equations
explain most of the variation in all three dependent variables.
Per capita income has a significantly positive impact on both
PRIVH and MMED, with respective elasticities (at the means) of
0.66 and 1.07. The most likely reason for INC's negative coefficient
in the K regression is that the income elasticity of non-covered
medical expenditures is relatively high. Per capita income obvi-
ously has a positive impact on PRIVH, and other studies (Feldstein,
1973; Stuart, 1972) indicate that MCARE and MCAID, the other
components of K's numerator, respond positively to income.
The variables UNION, SIZE, and NONAG outperform the other
two variables related to group insurance purchasing (MANU and
GOV). The first three variables exert positive impacts in all but one
case (SIZE in the MMED equation). But the elasticity associated
with SIZE in that case is virtually zero (—0.04). The health status
variable (BAD) is never significant. PAT65 behaves as expected.
The year dummy variables reveal a dramatic increase in coverage
for physicians' services, particularly in 1969 and 1970.
Predicted values from the PRIVH and MMED equations repre-
sent these variables in the empirical analysis of fee determinants.
Given the high degree of association between INC and MMED
(r= 0.78),use of predicted MMED values in the fee regressions
would increase multicollinearity unduly. Therefore, actual values
were used.4'
Medicare
Medicaresupplemental medical insurance per capita (state) popu-
lation (MCARE) is best described as the product of three ratios: (1)
the fraction of the population age 65 and over; (2) the fraction of the
age group over 65 that is enrolled in the supplemental insurance
program; and (3) supplemental insurance expenditures per en-
rollee. The first of the three is a demographic variable. As is well-
known, medical needs increase with age.
344 Sloanrelative to the
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0 —According to Feldstein (1971a), the second component reflects a (1973) md
number of factors—the proportion of individuals over 65 who are fee schedi
white, over age 75, live in cities of over 100,000 population, Intercai
Medicaid payments of Medicare deductibles and coinsurance, state years of
per capita income, and the proportion of the current population
under age 65 with surgical and medical insurance—"a measure of period. Ac
habit persistence in the purchase of insurance" (Feldstein, 1971a, a far gre
p. 6). communil.
Variations in supplemental expenditures per enrollee, the third
component of MCARE, reflect both the quantity of services
rendered to enrollees and reimbursement per unit of service under Wages
theprogram. Reimbursement policies are particularly important, The U.S. because if the program operated according to congressional intent, data on it would be impossible to argue that MCARE is an exogenous employ i determinant of physicians' fees. secretarial The law establishing Medicare requires that physicians be reim- areas, not bursed on basis of "customary, prevailing, and reasonable" series, in criteria. For purposes of this discussion, the essential part of this area) havc formula involves the "prevailing" charge. If Medicare carriers, area and d commercial insurance firms, or Blue Cross-Blue Shield organiza- nine cens tions followed the congressional intent, they would define "pre- of the vai vailing" charges by applying a standard percentile to the communi-
ty's cumulative distribution of physicians' fees. All fees below or at series by the percentile would satisfy the "prevailing" criterion. Also, the field-state carrier would update community fee profiles frequently so that its by profile would adequately represent the current distribution. Then priate cen as fees rose, so would reimbursement per unit of service, sent the But there is fairly conclusive evidence that Medicare carriers tices (Keh generally lacked the necessary data for constructing "prevailing" WAGE in
charges for specific procedures at the outset of the program.42 As a
result, fee schedules were often used to determine the reasonable
charge.43 When prevailing charges were based on a community fee
distribution, carriers employed varying percentiles in the commu- NOTES
nityfee distribution to define "prevailing," from the 75th to the 95th
percentile. Judging from AMA data on the distribution of fees,
1.U.S. Di
2.Monroe these differences in percentiles imply substantial differences in 3.U.S. Di
"prevailing" charges. In 1967, for example, the 75th percentile of 4.Alevizo
the national distribution of fees for a follow-up office visit and a 5.See Fe
routine hospital visit corresponded to between $7 and $8 for an McNan
office visit and between $9 and $10 for a hospital visit. Fees at the 6.That St
largem 95th percentile were $14 and $15, respectively. Fee schedules 7.Numbe
established by Blue Shield for reimbursing hospital visits under 3,404; S
theirregular plans were generally Huang and Koropecky and pe
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ISloan 347t reflects a (1973) indicate that carriers also differed with respect to updating
5 who are fee schedules and/or community fee profiles.
opulation, Intercarrier variation in reimbursement methods during the early
state years of the Medicare program justifies considering MCARE
opulation exogenous in analyzing fee behavior covering the 1967—1970
ieasure of period. Actual reimbursements reflect deliberate carrier policies to





important, The U.S. Department of Labor, in its Area Wage Surveys, provides
nal intent, data on wages for selected occupations. Physicians typically
employ female. personnel with nursingskillsand/or with
secretarial-clerical skills. Wage data are available for metropolitan
s be reim- areas, not states. To convert the wage series into a usable state
asonable" series, industrial nurse and secretarial wages (by metropolitan
art of this area) have been regressed on the population of the metropolitan
carriers, area and dummy variables to represent the years 1967—1970 and the
organiza- nine census divisions.45 The regressions (not shown) explain most
fine "pre- of the variation in both series (R2 =0.72for nurses and 0.51 for
communi- secretaries). Given parameter estimates of these equations, a wage
elow or at series by physician field, state, and year has been constructed. Each
Also, the
.field-state-yearobservation reflects the distribution of physicians
so that its by community size for that observation, the year, and the appro-
ion. Then priate census division. Since secretarial-clerical employees repre-






of fees, 1.U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1972).
2.Monroe and Roback (1971). in
3.U.S. Department of Commerce (1973). rcentile of 4.Alevizos, Walsh, and Aherne (1973).
,isit and a 5.See Fein (1967), for example,, on the alleged advantages of groups. Todd and
$8 for an McNamara (1971) provide data on the formation of groups.
ees at the 6.That study is an extension of a suggestion in Newhouse (1973); namely, that
schedules large medical groups may be relatively inefficient.
7.Number of observations in the 1967—1970 AMA sample: general practitioners, sits under 3,404; surgeons, 2,225; internal medicine, 1,895; obstetrics-gynecology, 774;
oropecky and pediatrics, 754.
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ii'I
Analternative to aggregating is to conduct the analysis at the level of the
. premisi
individual physician. However, data corresponding to the physicians' market run (S
area are needed for several independent variables. If data for an inappro- 17.The de
priately defined area are merged with records on individual physicians, the input.
parameter estimates will be biased toward zero. This bias is less likely to occur
if the observational unit is the state. An analysis of physicians' fees based on 18.The
another AMA sample and a somewhat different method has been conducted at most re
the micro level (Steinwaki and Sloan, 1974). A useful by-product of the present 19.Some s
investigation is a comparison of the results at two different levels of aggrega- special
tion. There are certain conditions under which aggregation is inappropriate, for pre
Theil (1971) states the precise conditions under which aggregation bias will relevan
arise. 20.Feldsti
8.U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1972). are mol
9.The quantity of services demanded is specified to depend on the mean fee. physici
There are other dimensions of physician costliness, but in view of the and, lik
information available, it is not possible to consider these. For example, some the em
physicians are more likely to recommend revisits for a specific diagnosis andlor output
admit patients to a relatively expensive hospital. Martin,
The physician's fee structure may reflect differences in the relative marginal gain ft
costs of providing specific services. For example, the hospital visit fee may
increase relative to a routine office visit fee as the distance between the setting.
hospital and the physician's office increases. Unfortunately, the data are not yet private
available in sufficient detail to capture variation in the marginal costs of
. mixof
providing specific services, and/or
10.Unless otherwise indicated, the data are from the American Medical Associa- differei
tion. of patie
11.There are alternative measures of physician experience. Among these are years factors
since graduation from medical school, years practiced in current specialty, and come r
age.The principal advantage of LIC1O is that it reflects experience in the 21.Fixed
geographic area of current practice as well as years in medicine and current the sm
specialty. It represents experience in the area imperfectly since some physi- compal
cians may secure licenses in several states soon after graduation (particularly in predict
those states known to be restrictive, such as California and Florida). No single 22.Studies
measure of physician experience is fully adequate, but fortunately all are variabl
positively correlated. So as an empirical matter,it does not make much dard"
difference which variables are selected. Steinw
12.For statistical evidence, see Health Insurance Association of America (1972). reports
The percentage of population with basic insurance was included in regressions ratio th
not presented in this paper. The variable tended to enter with a negative sign.
A possible explanation of this result is given below, would
13.This point is discussed in greater detail in Phelps (1975). He argues there that Nonlin
the direction of causation (positive or negative) from medical care prices to setting
insurance cannot be deduced. objecti
14.The proportions for other major fields are higher: pediatricians, 5 per cent; To calc
obstetricians-gynecologists, 19 per cent; internists, 22 per cent; and general C2 fron
surgeons, 55 per cent. 23. A reasc
15.Davis and Russell (1972) indicate that hospital admissions are positively that th
related to the price of hospital outpatient services. The same measure was used assump
in this study. fQ2. TI
16.The 10 per cent estimate is based on Goldstein (1972). Capital costs, particu- shift vs
larly those relating to space, have traditionally been considered relevant only e)/[2(ai
in the long run. However, some economists have correctly questioned the denorni
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premise that labor is always variable whereas capital varies only in the long
run. (See 01, 1962, for example.)
17.The dependent variables in both studies are measures of the physician time
input. The negative effect of income on the physician's time input implies a
positive effect on the physician's imputed wage.
18.The AMA has included questions on both property income and children on its
most recent survey of physician's practices (PSP8 conducted in late fall 1973).
19.Some sociological and psychological evidence related to physicians' choice of
speciality is available (see Sloan, 1968). This body of literature might be useful
for predicting specific types of cases the physician prefers, but is not really
relevant for studying output and price decisions.
20.Feldstein (1970, 1972) emphasizes that physicians' price and output decisions
are motivated by a desire to select interesting cases. Although it is clear that the
physician would on balance prefer to have some variety in the cases he treats,
and, like other professionals, probably seeks to avoid disagreeable customers,
the empirical importance of this factor to an inquiry into physician price and
output setting is questionable. The references Feldstein cites (Friedson, 1971;
Martin, 1957) do not specifically model the case selection process, nor does one
gain from these studies the impression that case selection is a particularly
important variable of choice, once the physician is established in a particular
setting. The Martin study refers to medical students, not to physicians in
private practice. If the physician wanted to make meaningful changes in the
mix of patients he sees, he would probably do better to change his specialty
andlor practice mode, since there are substantial interspeciality and intermode
differences in patient mix. Data presented in Sloan (1973) indicate that "type
of patient" has a role in practice mode choice, but is less important than other
factors such as "professional independence," "regularity of hours," and "in-
come potential."
21.Fixed costs in this context pertain to those associated with maintaining even
the smallest-scale practice. These are probably relatively unimportant in
comparison to the marginal costs. As seen below, the model as specified
predicts that marginal, not fixed, costs affect the physician's price.
22.Studies of physician fee-setting before Steinwald-Sloan found that several
variables in their regressions behaved in a manner inconsistent with a "stan-
dard" maximizing model of the type generally used by economists. The
Steinwald-S loan study, using better data than had previously been available,
reports signs on such variables as patient income and the physician-population
ratio that are consistent with profit maximization.
Equation (4) results in a price equation that may be readily estimated. This
would not be the case for a price equation derived from a utility function.
Nonlinearities arise with the use of plausible utility functions when price-
setting behavior is assumed. The comparative statics solutions, assuming an
objective such as Equation (4)'s or a utility function, are essentially the same.
To calculate ir as defined by (4), the physician subtracts the value he assigns to
C2 from his net practice earnings. Bothand C2 are measured in dollars.
23.A reasonable objection to the model presented in this section is the assumption
that the total cost function is linear. It is easily seen that this simplifying
assumption does not alter the essential form of the model. Let C =d+eQ+
fQ2. Then ir =Q(a,Q +aX) —d—eQ—fQ2, whereX stands for the demand
shift variables specified above. Differentiating with respect to Q, Q* =(—aX+
—f)] (I).The general form of the numerator is unchanged; the
denominator contains the term (a, —f)instead of a,. PK =[a,e+ a(1 —
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349 Physician Fee Inflation— J)](II). The term—f) appears in both the numerator and believj
denominator of (II), but not (6). However, the functional form of the price study, i
equation is unaffected, and regression analysis cannot be used as a basis for the phy
choosing between (6) and (II). virtual!
The terms a1 and f correspond to Professor Huang'sand(See his back on
comment on this paper.) The essential difference between the model he Second
proposes and the one presented in this paper is that his assumes that the with th
physician is a price-taker in a competitive market whereas mine assumes he has variabL
some monopoly power and sets prices. The latter assumption is a more 0.91. T
plausible one. My (a1 —J) may be negative in much the same way that his medica
(/3k —may be negative. 29.The tes
24.Equations' (8) and (9) specification implies that the average equals the marginal 30.No cost
coinsurance rate. The assumption is made necessary because of the lack of data 31.Regress
by state and year to develop marginal rates. Sloan and Steinwald (1974) present 32.The fac.
data on the relationship between average and marginal coinsurance rates. The account
average is much less than the marginal coinsurance rate for the appendectomy 33.Monte
fee. The two rates are much closer in the case of office visits. The fee equation is sever
would optimally contain a marginal coinsurance rate and a variable measuring 34.The sot
physician firm demand schedule shifts attributable to indemnity coverage. This Book, 1
latter point is discussed in greater length in Sloan and Steinwald (1975) and in 35.These
a forthcoming physician fee study by these authors (using AMA data specifi- issues o
cally collected to measure the effect of third-party reimbursement methods on 36.Indepe
physicians' fees). Insurance variables defined similar to K have been used in and Rec
Davis (1974), Feldstein (1970, 1971b), Fuchs and Kramer (1972), and Rosett 1968, a
and Huang (1973). Probably no one is fully satisfied with this type of variable, 37.Plus thl
but it is the best available. 38.Table 1
25.According to an AMA survey, almost 39,000 physicians practiced in groups in years, f
1969 compared with about 188,000 in patient care, office-based practice. See 39.Sources
Todd and McNamara (1971) and Haug and Roback (1970). Income
26.Some groups have apparently recognized potential disincentives inherent in tats, "C
group practice and have centralized decision making to some degree. See Sloan missing
(1974a). value is
27.Price level data come from the U.S. Department of Labor (1971). This source 40.Marmoi
gives cost-of-living data for selected cities and for nonmetropolitan by Koropec
census area. The index is constructed as follows: (1) for states for which only 41.See Nol
one city is listed, cost-of-living data for the city are taken as representative of all 42.Accordi
metropolitan areas in the state. Data for the census area in which the state is fee sch
located are used for nonmetropolitan location. The index is then constructedby 43.Huang
multiplying the metropolitan data by the percentage of population living in 44.Reed an
urban areas of the state and the nonmetropolitan data by 1 minus this than sd
percentage. Finally, the index is annualized by dividing the state index by the (1970).
Consumer Price Index for the year (1967 =100).The resulting index varies by 45.The nu
both state and year; (2) for states for which two cities are listed, the larger one is respecti
assumed to be representative. All other calculations are the same as #1; (3) for
states for which no cities are listed, the closest city is taken to be representative.
All other steps are the same.
In a few preliminary regressions, the price index was included as a separate
independent variable as an alternative to deflating. The index's coefficient was REFERENCI
notsignificant, and including this variable has little effect on the other
estimated coefficients. 1.
28.If fees have a positive impact on major medical coverage, the MMED (C
elasticities reported in the text are biased upward. There are two reasons for 2.
350 Sloan 351 Phbelieving that there is little or no upward bias. First, in the Steinwald-Sloan
study, individual physician.fees are regressed on MMED, which is defined for
the physician's as in the present study, and the MMED elasticities are
virtually the same. It is unlikely that the fee of the individual physician feeds
back onto a state average, particularly in view of the intrastate variation in fees.
Second, Phelps (1976) includes a medical care price variable in a regression
with the maximum payment under major medical insurance as the dependent
variable. The t value associated with the medical care price and its square is
0.91. This evidence suggests that major medical coverage is not sensitive to
medical care prices.
29.The test is from Kmenta (1971), p. 372.
30.No cost-side (or equivalent supply) variables enter Equation (10).
31.Regression (4), 1.08; Regression (5), 1.11.
32.The fact that there are fewer variables in the Table 2 regressions probably
accounts for the increased significant levels.
33.Monte Carlo experiments reported in Nerlove (1971) demonstrate that this bias
is severe.
34.The source of the Blue Cross-Blue Shield data is Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Fact
Book,1967—1970.
35.These data are available for the years included in the analysis in the January
issues of the Social Security Bulletin.
36.Independent plan benefit data come from Reed, Anderson, and Hanft (1966)
and Reed and Dwyer (1971). The surveys refer to 1965 and 1969. Data for 1967,
1968, and 1970 were obtained by linear interpolation.
37.Plus the exception noted in the preceding note.
38.Table 15. These data correspond to 1969. Judging from similar tables in other
years, the y's change very slowly. YB =0.296;Yc =0.390,and=0586.
39.Sources of PEXP and OPDEXP are U. S. Department of the Treasury Business
Income Tax Returns, 1970—1972; and American Hospital Association, Hospi-
tals, "Guide Issue," 1969—1971. When only a single value for a given state was
missing, the missing value was filled by linear interpolation. If more than one
value is missing, the state has been eliminated from regressions using K.
40.Marmor (1968), U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance (1970), and Huang and
Koropecky (1973).
41.See Note 28 for further discussion of this issue.
42.According to Huang and Koropecky, the vast majority of Medicare carriers used
fee schedules in 1967.
43.Huang and Koropecky (1973).
44.Reed and Carr(1970). Medicare fee schedules may have been somewhat higher
than schedules for regular business, See U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance
(1970).
45.The nurse and secretary regressions are based on 255 and 300 observations,
respectively.
1.Alevizos, C., R.J. Walsh, and P. Aherne, Socioeconomic Issues of Health
(Chicago: American Medical Association, 1973).
2.American Hospital Association, Hospitals, Guide Issue, 1969—1971.
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In his paper, Professor Sloan developed a model of physician fee-setting that well as incom
he tested with a four-year time series of state cross-section data. The =f
physician was treated as a firm that produces health services for consumers,
That is, facing the consumers' demand function and his own cost curves, the
physician determines the quantity and the price of his services that will ' Hisbehavior
maximize his business profit. and business
The explanatory variables that Professor Sloan employed in his demand marginal utili
function included insurance reimbursement factors such as the reimburse- income status
ment of private health insurance for physicians' services; the major medical sional ethical
insurance population; Medicare part B reimbursements and Medicaid expen- considering p
ditures for physicians' services, 'or the overall proportion of the physicians' explain the
expenditure that was reimbursed (K); and some selected socioeconomic medically int
demand factors of the physicians' potential patients. incentive coul



















In his cost functions, besides the quantity of services produced, Professor
Sloan included the physicians age and wages paid to non-physician person-
nel as independent variables.
The price equation employed can be derived in terms of all the indepen-
dent variablesin the demand and cost functions after the physician's
business profit is maximized. In the empirical study, average annual revenue
per visit and average usual charge were used as dependent variables
representing the price variables. Several regressions were estimated. The
results indicated that third-party reimbursement has a relatively greater
impact on average revenue than on usual physicians' fees. Among the
reimbursement factors, only the Medicare variable was consistently reliable
in the usual fee equations, although the impact elasticities associated with the
Medicare parameters were generally very low. Among other socioeconomic
variables, only the physician-population ratio and the non-physician wage
factor were relatively consistent and reliable.
In general, as in his other studies, Professor Sloan's paper has many
noteworthy aspects, including a clear statement of the hypotheses to be
tested and a careful comparison of the results with those reported by other
investigators. However, I am not sure what policy implications can be derived
from this research since the empirical results were generally insignificant or
inconsistent.
In this paper,I would like to offer the following criticisms with respect to
Professor Sloan's paper.
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Sloan's treatment of the physician as a health service firm and his use of the
traditional profit maximization theory to explain the physician's behavior
pattern are inappropriate. Here,I agree with Professor M. Feldstein's argu-
ment (1970) that "the physician is an individual who determines his quantity
and price to maximize utility and not profit," and, "a simple profit maximiza-
tion model does not allow for the physician's preferences for leisure time as
well as income." The physician's utility function can be defined as follows:
U = 1 (business profit, leisure time, professional ethical feeling, number of medically
interesting cases, etc.)
His behavior pattern is affected by the several variables in the utility function,
and business profitis only one of these.Itis generally agreed that the
marginal utility of leisure time to a physician is very high because of his
income status. The profit maximization model ignores the physician's profes-
sional ethical feeling, precluding the refusal of care to certain cases or
considering patients' costs when prescribing treatments. Nor can this model
explain the fact that some physicians apply price discrimination to select
medically interesting cases for the purposes of training and research. Profit
incentive could be a strong factor in his utility function, but the physician's
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behavior is too complicated to be explained by the simple model of profit 2. THE EMPIF
maximization.
Professor Sloan's demand function included some supply factors as In Sloan's pa
independent variables, such as the physician-population ratio, physician health insura
qualification status, and the percentage of various sizes of group practice. tures paid
This created an identification problem in his real demand function; namely, population w
that it is not possible to distinguish the demand from the supply function. coefficients
The traditional model of demand and supply market determination that previous stu
follows should not be ignored in this study: (1970), and
insurance rei
0 =I3iP + 132X1 <0 physicians'





where D and S represent the quantity of physicians' services demanded and PRIVH =
supplied, respectively, and X1 and X2 signify the exogenous demand and — DI
supply variables. X2 may include non-physician cost inputs (e.g., wage, rent, ÷ (F
and capital), the physicians' relative income factors, the physicians' qualifica- where BLUS
tion status, the physicians' average time input, the physician-population ratio, Blue Cross I
and the medical school enrollment, etc. From this model, the physician fee cial health a
equation is derived as: benefits;
1 ance plans;
a —
— a2X2) benefits for
Ip1
Blue Cross-
This is a reduced-form equation in which the variation in P is explained in spectively.
terms of the totality of exogenous demand and supply variables. In this value of 'y8,
equation (a1 — is positive.If132is positive, then the increase in the all the sampl
exogenous demand factors will tend to increase the physician fee.If a2 is the measure
positive, then the increase in the exogenous supply factors will tend to lower distortions o
the physician fee. Sloan's final price regressions are, in fact, the estimation of enrollment
this type of model, although he started from a profit maximization hypothesis. Also, Sloa
This type of model is most commonly employed in market research. Fuchs state's consi
and Kramer (1972) have successfully applied this type of model to estimate from one
the demand and supply functions for physician services. Their data was series and s
composed of a cross-section sample of thirty-three states. M. Feldstein (1970) dummy van
also used this model, but he failed to obtain the proper signs for price each indivic
parameters in the demand and supply equations. However, as he stated In his ge
clearly in his paper, his "estimates are based on the rather small sample of Medicare ai
quite imperfect data," and "the conclusion should be treated as preliminary that the Me
and subject to revision." Feldstein had a time series sample of only nineteen indicated th
years. Besides, his price and insurance factors could be overly massaged. reimbursem
Fuchs commented that Feldstein's result probably is "the failure to take cian's fee.
account of technological change" (1970). reimbursem
The AMA's data used by Sloan include a much larger sample of time and Koropei
series and cross-section data than were used by Feldstein and Fuchs. Prob- physician f
ably, by using the above model, Sloan could have obtained completely factor, and
different results. cians' fees
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2. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In Sloan's paper, three reimbursement variables have been selected: private
health insurance benefits per capita (PRIVH); a fraction of medical expendi-
tures paid by insurance—both private and public (K); and the percentage of
population with major medical insurance (MMED). The parameters of these
coefficients are hardly significant. The results contradicted almost all the
previous studies, including Huang and Koropecky (1973), M. Feldstein
(1970), and Fuchs and Kramer (1972), each of which indicated that the
insurance reimbursement factors have significant impact on the demand for
physicians' services and fees.
Sloan's measurement of the third-party insurance reimbursement variables
may contain serious errors, and therefore the true impact relationships were
disturbed and biased. For example, he defined:
PRIVF-I = {BLUSBEN + YBBLUSBEN + y, (COMBEN
— DISPAY — INDBEN) +Yi INDBEN}
÷ (POPP1)
where BLUSBEN equals Blue Shield insurance benefits, BLUSBEN represents
Blue Cross plus Blue Shield health insurance benefits; COMBEN is commer-
cial health and disability insurance benefits; DISPAY is disability insurance
benefits; INDBEN signifies insurance benefits of independent health insur-
ance plans; and YB'Yc andrepresent the fraction of health insurance
benefits for expenses other than hospitalization, with subscripts identifying
Blue Cross-Blue Shield, commercial ihsurors, and independent plans, re-
spectively. Since Professor Sloan did not have any information concerning the
value ofYc and y by state and year, the national averages were used for
all the samples. If the interstate variations of and y, are significant, then
the measurement error of PRIVH is serious. Similar measurement errors and
distortions of the true impacts arose for K and the major medical insurance
enrollment (MMED).
Also, Sloan's insurance benefit payments were deflated by each individual
state's consumer price index. State consumer price indexes vary substantially
from one state to another. In the regression analysis of the pooling of time
series and state cross-section data, it could be more appropriate to use a time
dummy variable in order to hold the time factor constant, rather than to use
each individual state's CPI as a deflator.
In his general specification price equation, Sloan also brought in such
Medicare and Medicaid factors as the reimbursement variables and found
that the Medicare variable was the only reliable and consistent one. This
indicated that Medicare reimbursement and other private health insurance
reimbursements have different impacts on the inflation of the general physi-
cian's fee. The results could be attributable to the Medicare methods of
reimbursement or psychological impacts of the governmental system. Huang
and Koropecky (1973) obtained similar results. They used the 1952—1 969 BLS
physician fee index and found that the insurance reimbursement, inflation
factor, and Medicare dummy variable could explain the increase in physi-
cians' fees up to 88 per cent. All the coefficients in their model are stable and
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significant, and the Medicare system contributed roughly 3 per cent of the
increase in physicians' fees per annum by increasing the coverage of
population and introducing the Medicare methods of reimbursement. In fact,
these methods alone may have contributed 1.8 per cent to the increase in
overall physicians' fees per annum. More careful investigation of the Medi-
care impact on physicians' fees and more detailed analysis of its causes are
needed in Sloan's paper.
One of the most controversial conclusions in Professor Sloan's paper is that
the physician-population ratio has a statistically significant negative impact
on physicians' fees. The conclusion implied that the increase in medical
education and the supply of physicians can at least temper fee inflation. In
•empirical studies of this type, this conclusion is unique and important.
Previously,Feldstein (1970) found that the increaseinthe physician-
population ratio is inclined to have a positive impact on the increase in
physicians' fees. Fuchs and Kramer (1972) found that this ratio has a very
significant positive impact on the demand for physicians' services, causing a
positive impact on the increase in physicians' fees. Huang and Koropecky
(1973)found that the ratio of physicians in private practice to population has a
statistically significant positive impact on the increase in Medicare physi-
cians' fees. They applied a nonlinear type of price adjustment model and
found that the physicians' population ratio has a positive impact, and last
year's price has a negative impact on the increase in Medicare physicians'
fees. In a total of eight regressions these results are all statistically significant
and consistent (pp. 30—31). These empirical results imply that the physicians'
population ratio may push up the price, but the price will rise at a decreasing
rate. Given other socioeconomic factors, the physicians' fees in the high-price
state will converge to the fees in the low-price state. In his paper, Professor
Sloan made two comments on Huang and Koropecky: First, that they obtained
some negative and insignificant impacts of physicians' population ratio on the
growth in Medicare physicians' fees; second, that their result implies that the
fees in high-ratio states will continue to diverge from fees in low-ratio states
without end. Both of these comments could be misinterpretations of the model
and the results in Huang and Koropecky's study.
The positive impact argument of the physicians on the increase in physi-
cians' fees was expressed mainly in three hypotheses: permanent excess
demand for physicians' services (Feldstein, 1970), self-generation of demand
by physicians (Fuchs and Kramer, 1972; Huarig and Koropecky, 1973), and
the physicians' maintenance of target income levels (Newhouse, 1970).
In Huang and Koropecky's study, the factors influencing the increase in
Medicare physician fees were investigated. The data base consisted of a 5
per cent sample of Medicare physicians' actual charges grouped by state for
the period of 1966—1969. They found that different methods of Medicare
reimbursements, the standard deviation of the physicians' fees, the previous
year's fees, and census region to be very important determinants. The
standard deviation of physicians' fees had a consistently significant positive
impact on the increase in Medicare physicians' fees in all the regressions
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generate a significant incentive for physicians who charge lower fees to catch
up to physicians charging higher fees. This would cause prices to rise faster
where the dispersion was greater.If this argument is verified, the policy
implication is profound. Fee inflation can be reduced if a method of regulation
or reimbursement can be designed so as to narrow the dispersion of
physicians' fees.
Huang and Koropecky used a dummy variable to indicate geographic
region in their estimation of Medicare price equations. They found that during
the three-yea.r period surveyed, given all other social, economic, and insur-
ance factors, western states had an 8 per cent higher rate of change than
nonwestern states in Medicare physicians' fees.
With the exception of the methods of reimbursement, Sloan's AMA data
were comparable to those used by Huang and Koropecky. I believe that he
could have obtained results similar to Huang and Koropecky's given the use
of the variables that they employed.
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Frank Sloan's paper is an interesting attempt to estimate empirically physi-
cian fee-setting behavior. But because of a variety of problems, most of which
can be attributed to less than ideal data, it is not clear whether many of the
results from this paper can be accepted per se with much confidence. The
study does, however, provide some interesting comparisons with a previous
study carried out by Steinwald and Sloan on a less aggregated basis.
I have two general reservations about the approach taken in the paper plus
a few difficulties either with the way a variable is constructed or with the way a'
result is interpreted.
j
359 Physician Fee InflationThe first reservation involves the use of data that are aggregated at the state variables or
level. The rationale for the aggregative data base is clear.It permits the health expen
pooling of data from a variety of sources. In addition, reimbursement data are PRIVH variabi
available only on an aggregate basis. Finally,it eliminates the need for regressions a
explaining all unexpected signs in terms of errors in attributing aggregative Since the neg
data to the micro level. On the other hand, the use of aggregate data makes it decision was
more difficult to interpret the results. The most serious problem involves the hospital visit
construction of a third-party reimbursement variable. One specification con- significant. S
tains three variables: private health insurance expenditures on health care study, is not
other than hospital in the state (PRIVH), Medicare SMI expenditures, and estimate the
Medicaid expenditures on physicians. Another involves the sum of the above sefting.In th
three divided by per capita health expenditures in the state. Obviously neither problems witl
specification is a true price for a given case and t is not clear effects you The Medican
are observing when you aggregate. distinct facto
There are essentially three distinct problems with the private health represents th
expenditure variable, although not all of these are aggregation problems per sign and is e
Se. The first problem is that the approximation is at best an average price the suggestlo
rather than a marginal price, even though we generally postulate that behavior charges is re
is influenced by what occurs at the margin. The existence of a variety of limits, revenue. Asic
floors, and exclusions could cause the marginal price to deviate substantially net price or a
from the average price. The second and perhaps most important problem is we just do m
that it is unlikely that the level and/or type of insurance is invariant across disturbed tha
individuals. This means that the only price" variable we can observe is the the importam
percentage of private health expenditures in a particular state covered by something el
insurance, even though there is reason to believe that the distribution of net a relativelyI
prices across individuals may be important. Third, even if everyone had the increase thel
same insurance package, the use of the average percentage of the norihospi- larly during tI
tal health bill in the state covered by insurance would produce measurement fee schedule
errors, since the physician's fees against which this percentage would apply been include
would differ. Thus, Ibelieve that there are substantial problems with the we could 'ust
third-party reimbursement variable as it now stands. Nonetheless,I would insignificant
agree with the author that his variable is an improvement over using the At a consii
percentage of the population with some form of insurance coverage, the latter and the age
being a variable that has been used in several earlier studies. whether or m
The second reservation involves the lack of a very well-specified model of state of prac
physician fee-setting. Although not allthat much being done hereis little sense u
different from what is being done elsewhere, in part by the author, the lack of a was also his
well-specified model makes some of the estimation appear to be more ad hoc variable of
than I think was the case and increases the difficulty of interpreting some of the obvious why
results. In addition,I am.very uneasy about the treatment of major medical as a variable
insurance (MMI). First, we are told that major medical insurance is endoge- that there are
nous to the system and then that actual rather than predicted values of major declining on
medical insurance are used in the Table 1 regressions because of collinearity of at least th6
between MMI and income. Irrespective of the sign and significance of the be an imprO'
variable, the primary conclusion one is left with is that a serious identification year would
problem remains. As indicati
In addition to the above two points, Ihave difficulty with a few other variations in
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variables or their interpretation. The most important one involves the private
health expenditure variable. In some initial estimations, Sloan found that the
PRIVH variable was consistently negative in the office and hospital visit fee
regressions although it was always positive in the average revenue equation.
Since the negative coefficient was regarded as being highly implausible, the
decision was made to exclude it from the final regressions for office and
hospital visit fees.First,itis unclear whether or not the variable was
significant. Second, the seriousness of this finding, given the purpose of the
study, is not made sufficiently explicit. A major purpose of the study is to
estimate the impact of third-party reimbursement on the physician's fee-
setting.In the first specification of third-party reimbursement, there are
problems with all three components. The Medicaid variable performs poorly.
The Medicare variable is generally significant but it is a proxy for several
distinct factors and is therefore difficult to interpret. Finally, PRIVH, which
represents three fourths of third-party reimbursements, has an implausible
sign and is excluded from the fee regressions. Thus I find it difficult to accept
the suggestion that the impact of private third-party reimbursement on usual
charges is relatively unimportant and the major effect is reflected in average
revenue. Aside from the fact that the variable was not a good reflection of the
net price or average cost that a physician's patients faced, it seems to me that
we just do not understand the effect of PRIVH on usual charges. I was also
disturbed that no attempt was made to explain the negative coefficient, given
the importance of this variable. Was it just inadequate data or a reflection of
something else that was going on? For example, one possibility is that there is
a relatively long lag between the time Blue Shield or other private carriers
increase their rates and inflationary pressures in the medical sector, particu-
larly during this period. If physicians feel obligated to stick to the established
fee schedule but bill separately for component services that previously had
been included in their "office visit" fee or which they previously had not done,
we could justify the positive coefficient for average revenue and a negative or
insignificant relationship to fees.
At a considerably lesser order of importance, I find the experience variable
and the age variable a little strange. Approximating experience in terms of
whether or not a physician has been licensed less than ten years in his current
state of practice does not seem very promising. In the first place, it makes
little sense unless you assume that the physician's current state of practice
was also his first state of practice. In addition,itis unclear why a binary
variable of this nature should be particularly helpful. Similarly,itis not
obvious why we would want to use the percentage of physicians over age 55
as a variable. Although it is essentially a human capital equation, it could be
that there are a lot of physicians over 55 because the area is a geographically
declining one, in which case it is not a human capital equation at all. The use
of at least the percentage over 55 and the percentage under 40 would seem to
be an improvement. Any information about the age distribution in an earlier
year would also be helpful.
As indicated at the outset, I think that this is an interesting attempt to explain
variations in fee-setting, but in the end, I do not think very much can be said
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about either the impact of reimbursement or about fee-setting dynamics, two
of the major interests of the study. The major difficulty in both cases (think is
data inadequacies. Perhaps the most interesting finding both here and in
Sloan's earlier disaggregative study is a small but negative relationship
between physician-population ratioand physician fees. The implication is that
the physicians' services market, at least for general practitioners, may work a
little more like an ordinary economic market than others have found.
Finally, Ibelieve that the only way we will be able to estimate the
relationship between third-party reimbursement and physician fees is when
the private health insurance expenditure data are available on a disaggrega-
tive basis. In particular, what is needed is a weighted average of the average
price, or better yet the net price prevailing in a physician's market area. Such
information is difficult to collect, would requirQ a well-designed survey, and
could probably only be derived accurately from physicians' billing records.
THREE
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